Overview

The OECD’s 2026 Scoreboard provides context on borrowing costs, collateral, discouraged demand, and alternative finance, but its standard indicators mainly cover employer SMEs across 48 countries, not US nonemployer firms. It reports higher-than-pre-pandemic SME interest rates in 34 of 39 countries and a higher share of SMEs requiring collateral in 10 of 17. Those patterns can clarify why formal finance may be restrictive, not prove what any US nonemployer owner faced. Missing dollar amounts, funding sequences, household exposure, and later outcomes limit causal conclusions.

Learning outcomes

OECD 2026 evidence contextualizes finance across 48 countries, but its standard indicators mainly cover employer SMEs, not US nonemployer firms.
Higher costs, collateral, and discouraged demand can help explain restrictive finance, but the sources do not establish a causal path for a specific owner.
The evidence lacks owner-funding amounts, timing, household exposure, and later firm outcomes needed to judge durable effects.

Keywords

Nonemployer firmsOECDCreditCollateralFintechMeasurement

The Wider Credit System and the Missing Data

For US nonemployer firms, the broader credit system matters not because an international average is their exact experience, but because it helps explain the conditions around a financing choice. This chapter separates what the OECD’s SME-finance evidence can illuminate—borrowing cost, collateral, uncertainty, and discouraged demand—from what it cannot establish about firms with no paid employees. It then uses that boundary to ask a practical question: when alternatives to owner money are discussed, what would make them fit, and what evidence is still missing?

What the wider credit evidence can—and cannot—explain

The OECD’s 2026 Scoreboard is a broad source of context. It brings together official financing indicators for 48 countries, generally covering 2007 through 2024 with more recent information where available. The indicators include debt, equity, asset-based finance, interest rates, collateral, applications, and business distress. But its standard indicators mainly cover employer firms: SMEs with at least one employee operating a nonfinancial business. That population is not the same as the nonemployer firms in the US Small Business Credit Survey.

This distinction is easy to lose because the financing mechanisms sound similar. A bank can require collateral from an employer SME and from a nonemployer firm. A higher interest rate can make both borrowers hesitate. A short-term loan can help either firm meet an expense. Yet the owner of a nonemployer firm may also be the main worker, the primary source of personal credit, and the person whose assets back the debt. The same market condition can therefore pass through a different balance-sheet structure.

Within its stated scope, the OECD describes a credit environment that helps make external capital an uncertain substitute for owner resources. Borrowing costs had begun to ease in many countries, but 34 of 39 countries still had higher SME interest rates than before the pandemic. Ten of 17 countries had a higher share of SMEs requiring collateral. New SME lending grew by a median 5.7% in 2024 after declining in 2023, but real lending in a selected group remained 20% below 2019. The stock of SME loans relative to GDP fell in 25 of 41 countries, and long-term SME loan volumes in a selected group fell 11% from 2021.

These figures do not describe the price or availability faced by a particular US nonemployer firm. They do show why a firm may encounter a financing market that is technically open but practically restrictive. Higher rates raise the future cash flow needed to service a loan. Collateral requirements ask the borrower to put an asset or guarantee behind the request. Shorter maturities may create more frequent refinancing or repayment decisions. Uncertainty makes it harder for both a lender and a borrower to assess whether future revenue will support a long-lived obligation.

The OECD’s account is especially useful for separating demand from access. It reports that in the European Union’s SAFE survey, 14% of SMEs applied for loans in the second quarter of 2024 and 13% in the third quarter, down from 17% in 2022 and 25% before the pandemic. At the same time, only 6% of SMEs that considered bank loans reported obstacles in obtaining them. If the firms most worried about approval or cost never apply, the firms left in the applicant pool can look easier to finance. A low observed rejection rate can coexist with unmet demand before the application stage.

Published by DeepMox

FAQ

What does the OECD 2026 Scoreboard add to the US nonemployer finance picture?

The OECD 2026 Scoreboard adds broader context on borrowing costs, collateral, applications, discouraged demand, and alternative finance. Its standard indicators mainly cover employer SMEs, so they are not direct estimates for US nonemployer firms.

What is the discouraged-borrower effect?

The discouraged-borrower effect describes firms that do not apply because they expect rejection or unsuitable terms, leaving applicants looking easier to finance. The OECD mechanism is interpretive, not a causal estimate for US nonemployer firms.

What data are missing about owner funding for US nonemployer firms?

The sources do not report owner-funding amounts, whether contributions were repayable, the sequence of personal and external finance, household exposure, or later firm outcomes. Those gaps limit causal conclusions.

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US nonemployer firms: wider credit context and missing data

The Wider Credit System and the Missing Data

What the wider credit evidence can—and cannot—explain

FAQ