What the Lawsuit Is Testing

The lawsuit over the TANF Data system is not one undifferentiated argument that privacy is important. It is a set of legal theories aimed at different parts of the data path described by the modified SORN. This chapter maps those theories to the agency's stated authority, its explanation and procedure, possible computer matching, and the relationship between federal funds and state obligations. The reader's practical gain is a precise way to report what the states allege, what the docket establishes, and what the supplied record does not yet show a court has decided.

The authority question comes first

The modified SORN lists 42 U.S.C. 1320b-7 and 8 U.S.C. 1373 in addition to the TANF provisions already cited in the notice. It also describes a purpose of checking grantee compliance through program-integrity reviews, audits, monitoring, fraud investigations, and verification of citizenship or immigration status. Routine use 10 then describes possible disclosure to another federal or grantee agency or entity engaged by ACF in that work.

That sequence presents an authority question: does the law that governs TANF and the cited federal provisions authorize the agency to use and disclose TANF records in the way the notice describes? Possessing information for one administrative purpose does not automatically answer whether the agency may use it for another purpose or share it with another institution. Likewise, listing a statute in a notice shows what the agency invokes; it does not establish that a court will accept the agency's interpretation.

The coalition of states argues that the answer is no. In the California Department of Justice's lawsuit statement, the plaintiffs say the SORN is contrary to law and exceeds statutory authority, particularly because the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 gives states substantial flexibility and limits federal oversight of TANF. The statement says nothing in that statute or other law supports the agency's asserted authority to share years of sensitive information with DHS and other entities. Those are the plaintiffs' contentions. The supplied materials do not include a judicial interpretation resolving the conflict between the agency's stated authorities and the plaintiffs' reading of TANF law.

The authority theory is therefore narrower than the question “is data sharing good policy?” It asks whether the federal agency has legal power to take this particular route: use TANF records for the stated verification purpose, draw on other sources, and disclose information to an entity engaged in the project. A court would need to examine the governing statutes, the relevant facts, and the agency's legal reasoning. The SORN is one of those facts; it is not the answer by itself.

The Administrative Procedure Act adds a reasoning question

The states also invoke the Administrative Procedure Act, or APA. In this setting, the APA is not simply a label for any disagreement with an agency. The plaintiffs' theories include two related but distinct ideas: the agency acted beyond statutory authority, and the agency acted arbitrarily and capriciously by failing to give a reasoned explanation for a significant change in practice. The first is primarily a power question. The second concerns the quality and adequacy of the agency's explanation and decision-making process.