Do Second Ventures Win Because Their Owners Learned?
The first-versus-subsequent-firm comparison is the closest thing in the Portuguese evidence to a test of entrepreneurial learning. It asks whether the later businesses of portfolio serial entrepreneurs outperform their own earlier businesses, rather than comparing one owner with a completely different population. That makes the question sharper, but not simple: the owners who reach a second venture have already survived an earlier selection process, and the later firm may inherit both lessons and resources from the first.
What the comparison can see
The Portuguese study calls the first business of a portfolio serial entrepreneur an FSE firm. It is the business the owner had before their ownership history qualified them as a portfolio serial entrepreneur. An SSE firm is a subsequent business—the second or later firm whose existence creates that classification. The distinction is chronological and tied to the owner’s history. It is not a rating of first firms as failures or subsequent firms as improvements.
That distinction matters because the comparison changes the baseline. A novice-versus-portfolio comparison asks how two groups of owners and firms differ. An FSE-versus-SSE comparison asks how businesses associated with the same broad type of owner differ before and after the ownership history expands. If later firms are larger, more productive, or more durable, one possible explanation is that the owner learned. If first firms already look different from other firms, however, the owner’s starting position is part of the story before any second venture appears.
The time sequence also creates an important gate. An owner must first have a business that remains observable and then become involved in another business before they can enter the subsequent-firm group. Owners whose first firms close and who never start another firm cannot appear as SSE owners. Owners who will eventually start another business but do so after the observation window may be classified differently. The comparison is therefore between firms at different points in a selected ownership path, not between randomly assigned “before” and “after” observations.
The sequence is a map of interpretive possibilities, not a claim that every arrow is measured directly. The administrative data can observe firms, owners, workers, and many realized outcomes over time. It cannot observe a clean measure of what an owner learned between two ventures, nor can it assign the same owner an otherwise identical business without that experience. The comparison is valuable precisely because it narrows the question while leaving those causal gaps visible.
The researchers’ broader distinction is between learning and selection. They use “learning” broadly enough to include improvements in owners’ skills and other ex-post forces, such as accumulating net worth.