What Employee Equity Can—and Cannot—Buy
Employee equity in startups can buy a firm time, employee participation in future upside, and—in the right conditions—a stronger reason to stay and contribute. It cannot buy the immediate certainty of salary, remove the employee's exposure to the firm's future, or substitute automatically for a credible job and advancement path. The answer to the central question is therefore not that equity is a poor form of compensation. It is that equity is a different instrument. Its value depends on the financing constraint that produced it, the moment when it can be realized, the alternatives available to the employee, and the organizational conditions surrounding the claim.
The evidence examined here supports that conclusion from two complementary directions. Finnish startup data show that binding wage constraints reduce employee equity and that the induced ownership changes affect next-year exit and measured advancement for a local group of workers. U.S. evidence on broad-based stock options shows that unvested value can reduce turnover for a period, with most of that reduction later reversed after vesting. Together, the studies make equity too important to dismiss and too conditional to treat as salary paid in another form.
The apparent substitution is a bundle of exchanges
The simplest salary-equity comparison asks how much cash can be replaced by a given number of shares. The more accurate comparison asks what each instrument transfers, when it transfers it, and who bears the uncertainty. Salary transfers purchasing power now. Equity transfers a contingent claim on the firm's future value. In a startup, that claim may be difficult to value between financing events, and its realization depends on the firm's future value and, for some claims, on continued employment. The employee receives potential upside, but also accepts timing and firm-value risk.
The startup faces a corresponding exchange. Cash wages draw on scarce internal liquidity and can be difficult to finance when access to outside capital is costly. Equity conserves cash, but it dilutes founders and other existing owners and may change control over future decisions. A founder who grants equity is not avoiding a cost; they are moving part of the cost from the current cash budget into the ownership structure. The employee is not receiving a free supplement; they are receiving a claim whose value may or may not compensate for the risk and delay.
That is why the Finnish paper treats employee equity as an endogenous financing margin. When a binding wage floor raises required cash compensation, there can be less room for an ownership claim under the employee's participation condition. The study's first-stage results show this adjustment: exposure to an extension reduces individual employee equity by roughly 10–11% in the reported specifications while wages rise. The firm is not necessarily abandoning incentives. It is reallocating a constrained compensation budget after an external rule changes the cash requirement.
The same equity claim then has an incentive role. In the Finnish model, the employee's share of output makes effort more valuable to them. Effort can increase the value of remaining with the firm and can improve the probability of promotion. This is a different path from cash conservation. The wage constraint shapes the grant; the grant can shape behavior. The two roles belong in one model, but they should not be collapsed into one measure of pay.
That separation also clarifies why a smaller equity grant after a wage increase is not automatically a loss in every dimension. The employee may receive more cash security and less exposure to future upside. The founder may preserve more ownership and control while carrying a larger payroll burden. The firm may retain an incentive effect through the equity that remains, but the employee's reason to wait for a future outcome may be weaker. The compensation mix has changed even if the total expected package has not been estimated to change in one direction.
Nor does the model imply that every firm must respond to higher wages by cutting equity. A company with ample liquidity may expand the total package. Another may reallocate grants, reduce hiring, or seek a different financing source. The negative equity response is a prediction for a binding constraint, and the Finnish evidence identifies it in a setting where collective-bargaining extensions create an external cash shock. It is not a universal rule for every compensation negotiation.
The paper's comparisons with wages reinforce the point about economic importance without solving the equivalence problem.