Reading Funding Stress Without Being Misled by a Single Rate

The final question is why a calm effective federal funds rate (EFFR) can coexist with tighter funding at smaller banks, and what a reader should do with that apparent contradiction. The answer is not that one rate is trustworthy and the other is not. It is that each rate is produced by a different slice of the funding system. A sound judgment therefore follows the rate back to its lenders, borrowers, reserve pool, timing, and available alternatives before extending the signal to the wider banking system.

The answer is a problem of representation

The causal chain begins with the Federal Reserve’s operating framework. After the Global Financial Crisis and large-scale asset purchases, reserve balances became abundant and monetary-policy implementation moved from a scarce-reserves regime toward an ample-reserves regime. Administered rates, including IORB and the ON RRP rate, provide anchors for short-term interest rates. That framework can keep EFFR stable even when the banking system holds historically high levels of reserves.

A stable EFFR is therefore evidence that the aggregate benchmark is being controlled. It is not evidence that every institution faces the same marginal price of liquidity. The difference becomes visible when the market’s composition is added to the framework. The Federal Reserve note reports that non-bank lenders, especially FHLBs, account for more than 90 percent of federal funds lending cited in the analysis, while traditional interbank volume is much smaller, at roughly $2 billion to $6 billion per day. A volume-weighted median shaped largely by the first group can remain relatively calm while a lower-volume bank-to-bank network experiences a different reserve condition.

This is the first link in the explanation: EFFR is not a census. It is a summary of transactions, and the transactions that have the greatest influence on its center are not evenly distributed across lender types or banking segments. The rate can be accurate, stable, and useful while still being less responsive to smaller institutions that trade through a specialized intermediary.

The second link is the bankers’ bank. These institutions were created to help community and regional banks pool resources and obtain funding, settlement, and liquidity services without depending entirely on large correspondent banks that could also compete for their retail deposits. Their national balance-sheet footprint is modest—the note reports 12 active bankers’ banks and about $10 billion in combined assets at the end of 2024—but their position in the funding chain gives them informational importance.

Bankers’ banks commonly lend their customers’ excess reserves. That makes them marginal lenders to a defined network of community and regional banks. When the reserves available through that network are ample relative to demand, the channel can price calmly. When the relevant pool becomes thinner or the demand for overnight funds increases, the marginal price can rise. The mechanism does not require the entire banking system to run out of reserves. It requires a particular funding network to experience a change in the value of immediately available funds.

BFFR makes that network visible. It is the daily volume-weighted median of identified overnight federal funds transactions in which bankers’ banks lend to domestic bank borrowers. The study’s transaction-identification window runs from October 2015 through August 2025. The measure is narrower than EFFR by design: it filters for the lender, the borrower, the maturity, and the transaction type before summarizing the center of the observed rates.

That filter explains why BFFR can tell a different story without contradicting EFFR. EFFR is heavily influenced by high-volume non-bank lending.