From Principles to Probabilistic Preferences
RLAIF is the point in Constitutional AI where a principle stops merely asking for a better answer and starts selecting among answers. This chapter traces that comparison interface and the path from a model’s choice to a preference-model reward and an RL policy update. The distinction matters because four different objects are easy to collapse into one: the constitutional rule, the feedback model’s judgment, the preference model’s score, and the reward that changes the policy.
The comparison interface has more parts than a verdict
The process begins with a prompt and a policy capable of producing responses. For each prompt, the policy generates a pair of candidate answers. The pair is then presented to a feedback model along with a constitutional principle. Instead of asking the feedback model to write a free-form evaluation with no defined output, the system turns the task into a multiple-choice question: which response is more helpful, honest, or harmless under this principle?
That formatting decision is more consequential than it may appear. The feedback model is not asked to declare an absolute score for either answer. It is asked to choose between two alternatives in a fixed interface. The conversation provides context, the principle defines the criterion, and the response pair defines the local decision. The answer is then read from the model’s probabilities for the choice tokens, rather than from a separate human label.
A simple example can make the boundary clear without relying on a dangerous request. Suppose a user asks a sensitive question and one candidate answer gives a terse refusal while the other explains the concern and offers a safe way to continue. A principle that values harmlessness without excessive reactivity may favor the second response. A principle focused on avoiding illegal assistance might favor the response that draws a firmer boundary. The feedback model’s job is not to invent a new constitution in either case. It interprets the supplied principle in the context of the two candidates.
The research uses multiple principles and samples one for each comparison. The principles ask for combinations such as helpfulness, honesty, harmlessness, politeness, and ethical awareness, while warning against toxicity, social bias, illegal assistance, preachiness, or overreaction. Sampling changes the criterion’s wording and emphasis across examples. It is a way to expose the preference model to several constitutional views of the same broad goal rather than teaching it one rigid sentence.
The output of the feedback model is not just a hard winner. The authors compute the log probabilities assigned to the two answer choices and normalize them into preference targets. If the model assigns similar probabilities to A and B, the training example retains some indication that the comparison is uncertain. If it strongly favors one choice, the target is more decisive. This is the role of a soft label: it carries the degree of preference instead of erasing it into a binary zero or one.
That distinction changes the information passed to the next component.