Overview
This series explains why falling U.S. house prices during the Great Recession hit young and small firms through more than demand: lost entrepreneur collateral and tighter local-bank credit interacted with firm age, entry, employment, and exit. Firm-level evidence, a Texas home-equity comparison, and a calibrated model support a conditional two-balance-sheet account, while proxies, identification assumptions, model gaps, and source status limit universal or program-level conclusions.
Learning outcomes
- During the U.S. Great Recession, falling house prices could tighten both entrepreneurs’ collateral and local banks’ credit supply.
- Young firms were initially more sensitive than older small firms; larger established firms were less responsive, while local-bank exposure still affected older small firms in the reported setting.
- Entry, employment, and exit are different margins, so missing entrants and failed firms can prolong damage after prices or lending recover.
- The evidence supports a conditional U.S. mechanism, not a universal estimate: financing measures are proxies, instruments rely on assumptions, and model counterfactuals are not program evaluations.
Keywords
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PlansFAQ
Why did falling U.S. house prices hurt young firms?
They hurt young firms through two financing routes: lost owner collateral and tighter credit from housing-exposed local banks, alongside weaker local opportunities.
How is home equity different from local-bank credit supply?
Home equity changes the borrower’s pledgeable assets; local-bank credit supply changes the lender’s willingness or capacity to offer loans, spreads, or limits.
Why can a housing shock affect entry, employment, and exit differently?
It can block a potential entrant, reduce hiring or investment at a continuing firm, or force exit; missing entrants and exits can make recovery incomplete.
Can bank support alone offset the financing shock to young firms?
No. In the model, removing credit-spread pressure still leaves a severe contraction because lost collateral, firm adjustment, and missing entrants remain; the counterfactual is not a program evaluation.