Overview
NOIR explores whether cloud-assisted code generation can hide prompt and code semantics, not just plaintext, when an open-source LLM is split between client and cloud. The series traces embedding inversion, local model boundaries, INDVOCAB, LTOKENIZER, STUNING, attack and utility results, and BLB’s cryptographic alternative. It supports a qualified privacy claim under an honest-but-curious cloud, secret client state, evaluated workloads, and tested attacks.
Learning outcomes
- NOIR keeps prompt preparation and final code decoding local, but the cloud still sees useful intermediate representations.
- INDVOCAB limits input-token distinguishability, LTOKENIZER obscures output-token interpretation, and STUNING adapts the split model.
- Reported attacks fall sharply under the combined defenses, including zero highlighted code-functionality attack success, but only in tested settings.
- Stronger privacy can reduce Pass@1; candidate generation, tuning data, hardware, and network conditions change the practical trade-off.
Keywords
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PlansFAQ
What does NOIR protect in private code generation?
NOIR keeps raw prompts and decoded code on the client and reduces their reconstruction in the evaluated attacks, rather than making the cloud see nothing.
How do INDVOCAB and LTOKENIZER work together?
INDVOCAB makes input token embeddings harder to distinguish, while LTOKENIZER hides the client’s output-token mapping. STUNING adapts the split model to those changes.
Does NOIR guarantee that the cloud cannot infer prompt semantics?
No. NOIR supports a qualified reduction in measured reconstruction under an honest-but-curious cloud, secret client state, and the evaluated workloads and attacks.
How does NOIR compare with BLB?
NOIR targets semantic privacy in split code generation, whereas BLB protects client input and server computation through hybrid HE/MPC. Their metrics and costs are not interchangeable.